By one estimate, there have been 18 hijackings by pirates since November, including a Bangladesh-flagged vessel called MV Abdullah that was seized by Somali pirates in March. From the outset, Bangladesh’s government sought to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis, eventually reaching an agreement to free the ship and its 23 crew members earlier this month.

While a lot of attention has been paid to how larger countries, such as India, are using their high-end naval capabilities to respond to the surge in maritime threats, the case of the MV Abdullah shows how smaller countries with fewer capabilities also have stakes in the security of the Indian Ocean and are forging their own paths.

Bangladesh, in particular, has seen its presence and reach in the Indian Ocean expand over the last decade. Like many countries in the region, it seeks continued economic development and expanded exports. Bangladesh is set to graduate from the U.N. list of least developed countries in 2026 based on the growth of its economy — which has been overwhelmingly propelled by the exports of its well-known readymade garments industry. And with roughly 90 percent of its international trade depending on the sea, Bangladesh’s national growth is linked to the maritime domain broadly and is affected by its uncertainties.

Dhaka is managing complex developmental ambitions with recent concerns about the cost of longer shipping routes for exports and rising strategic competition between larger powers in the Indo-Pacific. In the wake of the safe release of the MV Abdullah ship and crew, it’s a good time to analyze Bangladesh’s contributions to maritime security and consider where the country might go from here.

Bangladesh’s Expanding Naval Capabilities and Operations

While India and Pakistan are significantly larger in terms of regional naval capability, Bangladesh’s capability stands out among the smaller South Asian countries.

In 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced a modernization program for its military services, which has produced significant advancements for the Bangladesh Navy through surface, air and undersea platforms.

Bangladesh has looked to China for decades as its top source of military sales, including its first submarines commissioned in 2017 and their base inaugurated in March 2023. But the country is not only buying ships — it is also building them. In July, the prime minister inaugurated the Sher-e-Bangla naval base, which houses domestically built patrol and landing craft. Roughly a decade ago, leaders in the Indian Navy used to speak about the service’s transition from a “buyer’s navy” to a “builder’s navy.” Bangladesh’s ability to implement a similar transition is worth monitoring in the coming decades.

Putting its expanding capabilities to use, the Bangladesh Navy conducts not only regional but also distant naval operations. In fact, the country is transitioning from being a well-known recipient of disaster relief to a provider of disaster relief to Sri Lanka and the Philippines — and, at the start of the COVID pandemic in 2020, the Bangladesh Navy delivered relief supplies to Maldives.

And while Bangladesh is a top contributor of troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations, it also contributes a ship and personnel to the Maritime Task Force of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the Mediterranean Sea. In October, a 75-person Bangladesh Navy team rotated to UNIFIL.

Bangladesh’s Growing Role in Maritime Bodies

Beyond naval capabilities and operations, Bangladesh is demonstrating leadership in international maritime institutions. Its decisions to resolve maritime boundary disputes with Myanmar in 2012 and India in 2014 under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea have helped advance the role of legal norms in the Bay of Bengal and wider Indo-Pacific.

Bangladesh has also played a leading role in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). From 2016 to 2018, the Bangladesh Navy served as chair of IONS and organized its first at-sea exercise in 2017. Bangladesh has since participated in working groups, including recently serving as co-chair of the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief IONS working group with India.

In 2023 alone, the country demonstrated leadership in other maritime institutions. After years of criticism regarding its ship-breaking industry, Bangladesh signed on to the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (HKC) in June. Its decision helped the agreement meet the threshold to enter into force globally. As a result, Bangladesh will not permit shipbreaking in yards that do not have HKC certification beginning in June 2025, thereby advancing sustainable ship recycling.

In October, Bangladesh completed a two-year term as chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Then in November, Bangladesh’s permanent representative to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was voted to become first vice president of the 33rd Assembly meeting. This is a first-time achievement for Bangladesh to be elected to a senior position at an IMO assembly.

Just a month later, Bangladesh was then elected to the council of the IMO, which sets standards for global shipping. This was a competitive process in which countries lobby for selection, and Bangladesh was elected to Category C council membership for the next two years by a substantial majority of countries. This category is a third tier of countries with maritime interests and whose election provides key geographic representation. While Bangladesh is in South Asia, other countries in this category are in different regions and range from Denmark to Indonesia to Mexico.

Taken together, the above actions illustrate Bangladesh’s desire for a greater role and recognition of its expanding presence in contributing to maritime security and stability in the region and beyond.

Relationship with the United States

In April 2023, Dhaka issued the Indo-Pacific Outlook of Bangladesh, which identifies national objectives and approaches amid often-contested regional security. As Bangladesh continues to build its maritime capabilities in alignment with this vision, it should do so with an eye toward its longstanding successful security relationship with the United States.

Dhaka should consider joining the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a growing 43-nation coalition that contributes to maritime security in the western Indian Ocean. Bangladesh would be the last South Asian country with a navy to join CMF. For comparison, Pakistan has already contributed and commanded CMF counterpiracy and maritime security task forces. India joined CMF as an associate partner in 2022, announced its full membership this past November, and contributed to its first operation as a full member this month. Sri Lanka also joined CMF as a partner in December and conducted a maritime security operation with CMF in February in the country’s first major international operation.

Dhaka should also consider signing the U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) on logistics and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) to advance their enduring security and defense relationship. In August, Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen announced that the government had postponed discussions about signing the two U.S. defense foundational agreements until after Bangladesh’s January 2024 elections. While the United States raised the temperature on Bangladesh regarding the conduct of its election process before January, Washington appears to now be focused on the way forward in the relationship.

As a result, a discussion about Dhaka signing the ACSA and the GSOMIA is worth reengaging on ahead of annual partner dialogues between the two countries. In the meantime, the recurring Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise between the U.S. Navy and Bangladesh Navy is taking place this month.

Even as it has demonstrated strengths in the maritime realm, Bangladesh faces questions in the short term about its debt burdens and ability to maintain sufficient foreign currency reserves. More broadly, to what extent can Bangladesh bolster a greater, sustainable standing as a maritime security provider in South Asia and the Indian Ocean without getting caught in the currents of major-power rivalries? These are questions for Dhaka and policymakers seeking partnership with Bangladesh in the coming decade.