Three Vital Elections

Moldova’s three upcoming votes are central to its long struggle for sustainable independence from Russian domination through “oligarch rule” by corrupt billionaires. An October presidential election will test whether Moldova’s first government by a grassroots, pro-democracy party can sustain its reforms to uproot corruption and Russian interference. An opinion poll this month shows President Maia Sandu, who favors alignment with Europe, leading Russia-aligned opponents. Also for October, Sandu’s government has set a referendum to seek voters’ ruling on whether Moldova should join the European Union (EU). Parliamentary elections nine months later will inflect Moldova’s future regarding corruption, democracy, poverty and Moldova’s place in Europe.

Russia is escalating its years of “gray zone” assaults on Moldova  — disinformation, cyberattacks, bomb threats and other manipulations. That campaign is part of what experts and government officials discuss as Russia’s steadily evolving “hybrid war” from the Baltic to the Black Sea: its invasion of Ukraine and destabilization efforts against Georgia, Estonia and other neighbors.

Russia’s latest step on Moldova came week. It hosted the formation in Moscow of a political alliance around billionaire fugitive Ilan Shor, convicted in 2017 in a massive bank fraud and sanctioned internationally for conducting Kremlin interference in Moldovan elections. Shor’s new bloc (“Pobeda,” or “Victory”) holds just four of 101 parliament seats and, analysts say, cannot hope to win election. But it can work as a Russian-style “spoiler party” to drain support from more centrist groups, heightening polarization and risks of violence.

As the Shor bloc’s activists flew home from Moscow, Moldovan police confiscated $1.1 million in cash they were carrying to buy votes and anti-government demonstrations, officials said. Moldovan intelligence chief Alexandru Musteata says Russia has assigned Shor’s party as its main instrument to foment protest and disrupt the referendum on EU membership. Over years, Moldovan prosecutors, U.S. sanctions and independent investigations have documented the Shor network’s roles as a Russian proxy: election interference, cash payments to people for joining anti-government street protests; and disinformation campaigns through fabricated social media accounts. Moldovan newspaper Ziarul Garda detailed one such campaign in 2022; a British prodemocracy group, Reset, uncovered others that used Facebook in 2023 and again in January 2024.

Vectors of Influence: Corruption and Transnistria

Putin’s main tools for destabilizing Moldova are his weaponization of corruption through billionaire allies like Shor and former ruling party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, and Russia’s influence over two restive regions: Gagauzia, a Shor stronghold in the south; and Transnistria, at Moldova’s eastern edge. Russia dominates Transnistria, which declares itself independent, through its command of an estimated 1,000 or more troops, plus intelligence services and alliances with corrupt local elites. Moscow signals that Moldova will not get Transnistria back unless it accepts Russian rules limiting its independence — including a ban on joining the EU.

This year’s new tensions include Transnistria. In January, Moldova extended its national system of import-export duties to Transnistria, part of regularizing commercial rules under a trade agreement with the EU. Transnistria, dependent solely on Moldova for trade after Ukraine sealed its border following Russia’s invasion, quickly asked Russia’s “protection.” While that fell short of past Transnistrian appeals for outright Russian annexation, some Western analysts worried about an aggressive Russian response or warned of risks in a Moldovan strategy to now push Transnistria toward reintegrating with Moldova.

But Transnistrians’ protest was less threatening than it might appear, said Vladimir Lupan, a former Moldovan diplomat and negotiator with Transnistria. “I have seen that the primary concern of Transnistrian elites is to preserve their ability to make profits,” he said in an interview. For years, Transnistrian leaders’ have demanded to avoid any legal controls, “even [license] number plates on their trucks or inspections by customs officials,” Lupan said, for the widely acknowledged illegal as well as legal trade that feeds those elites’ revenue streams. More broadly, Transnistria’s separation from Moldova is increasingly diluted by a creeping integration of its economy with Moldova and Europe.

A bizarre event in March was Transnistria’s release of a video showing an object hurtling from the sky to destroy a derelict, old helicopter at a Transnistrian military facility, calling it a Ukrainian drone attack. Ukraine, Moldova and western analysts described the video as an evident fabrication; Russia demanded an investigation.

A Target: Moldova’s Gagauz Region

The Kremlin’s main new pre-election target has been Moldova’s estimated 120,000 Gagauz — ethnically Turkic, Russian-speaking, Orthodox Christians who live in an autonomous region. Moscow’s rising ally there is Yevgenia Gutsul, backed by Ilan Shor and elected Gagauzia’s governor last year. Russia hosted Gutsul twice this spring for a meeting with Putin and waves of interviews on Russian state media in which she amplified Gagauz fears of being marginalized in a Europe-aligned Moldova.

Research and Moldovan journalists show Russian disinformation especially powerful among Russian-speakers, rural residents and those who most suffer “pervasive” poverty in what is one of Europe’s poorest countries. These features apply in Gagauzia and the south, where 40 percent of people have been living below Moldova’s poverty line.

On April 3, Romanian Prime Minister Ion-Marcel Ciolacu declared his support for an eventual reunification of Moldova and Romania, a long-discussed, historical idea that Lupan and other analysts agree is unlikely in any foreseeable future. Gutsul riposted on Russian state television that Gagauzia would secede and that its welfare can be protected only by a close alliance with Russia. Gutsul will remain a flashpoint of conflict, notably after Moldova’s anti-corruption prosecutor indicted her last week for allegedly funneling millions of dollars into Moldova for illegal political operations by Shor’s party.

Moldova’s Partners Can Support Stability

U.S. and other supporters of Moldovan democracy and stability should “surge” their efforts immediately in four areas, Lupan and others say:

Confidence-building measures. Long-term stability will require peacebuilding, including dialogue initiatives — official and unofficial, at national and grassroots levels — to help Moldovans build consensus on a future that offers prosperity and dignity for all — including Russian-speakers, Transnistrians and Gagauz. But dialogue processes need time, especially against headwinds of Russian disinformation and hate speech. Immediate steps amid heated elections could be confidence-building measures, said Lupan. Emphatically apolitical humanitarian missions across communal divides — particularly into Gagauzia — could erode distrust and communal hatreds in helping impoverished people with such basic needs as food or medical care.

Balanced information. Democracies could urgently help Moldova’s press and information institutions with an elections-season “goal of ensuring that the population receives balanced information” on public issues, said Lupan. He noted “excellent work” by Moldovan civic groups, a small EU Partnership Mission in Moldova and the government’s new Center for Strategic Communication and Combatting Disinformation. Specifically for this 15-month election season, “we need to develop the capacity to conduct public debates that are serious and well-informed,” Lupan said. Video providers “need the ability, for example, to do instant fact-checking” in a candidates’ debate “and immediately cite the facts on the bottom of the screen” when discussions stray into baseless claims. He urged new support for Moldova’s prodemocracy and polling organizations to better monitor public sentiments.

Real-time defenses against disinformation. Lupan noted independent findings, by Ziarul de Garda and the British investigator Reset that Facebook has become an especially dangerous and recurring vector for Russian-language disinformation. He urged that international partners find ways to swiftly remove fake accounts and campaigns, perhaps helping Moldova’s Association of Electronic Press or other institutions build capacities for real-time detection and warning. The U.S. and Moldovan governments promised “additional joint efforts” against disinformation last week as part of their joint “strategic dialogue.”

Election integrity and monitoring. Moldovan and international institutions should intensify and unify all election integrity efforts, specialists urge. Lupan noted one recent abuse: Russian employers in Transnistria busing their workers to polls and requiring them to take cellphone photos of their marked ballots to prove that they voted as instructed to keep their jobs. Technical assistance also is vital: For example, Moldovan authorities say they must counter new Russian tactics, using digital credit apps and cryptocurrencies, to funnel election-warping cash into the country. Importantly Moldova can clarify election rules to avoid reversals such as last month’s Constitutional Court decision overturning a last-minute ban issued last year on candidates from Shor’s party in local elections.